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 Illegal Peace? Power Sharing with Warlords in Africa
 By Jeremy Levin
 The price of apathy towards public affairs is to be ruled by evil men.
 ? Plato
 This paper examines the legality of power-sharing in Africa with specific reference to the
 Accra and Lome accords, which brought about a fragile cessation of the conflicts in Liberian
 and Sierra Leone, respectively. It examines the future of international criminal law vis-a-vis
 power-sharing by prospectively examining gaps in state practice and rules that arguably
 permit the "crime of illegal peace" by insurrectionists, political elites, and moral guarantors.1
 When warlords use violence to coerce democratically constituted governments to share
 power, does power-sharing simply become a euphemism for "guns for jobs"? Which legal
 rules, if any, govern peace agreements in internal conflicts? Specifically, which rules regulate
 power-sharing? Are the aims of peace, justice, and adherence to the rule of law attainable,
 let alone compatible, with coerced political transitions where warlords violently force demo
 cratically constituted or legitimate governments to share power? Should international law
 criminalize political elites that share power with warlords and rebels that have committed
 gross human rights and humanitarian law violations?
 Consider this scenario: a rebel group, through brutal force, coerces a democratically elected
 government into a power-sharing arrangement that not only refashions the constitution of
 the order, but confers on the rebels unconditional amnesty, key government positions, and
 other privileges. Although the incumbent government prefers to punish the rebels rather than
 negotiate with them, it shares power out of political necessity and expediency because it
 lacks the muscle to defeat the rebels on the battlefield and the status or legitimacy to mobilize
 international military assistance to impose its political prerogatives. The failure to negotiate
 a cessation of hostilities inevitably results in prolonged conflict, anarchy, and the eventual
 toppling of the government.
 Variations on this scenario have been commonplace in Africa for decades. Governments
 that have been violently and successfully challenged from within, but are still recognized as
 the de jure representative of the state, are faced with the quandary of how best to negotiate
 peace, maintain security, survive politically, and manage future uncertainties. They are forced
 to make strategic choices that often create normative friction between what is legal on one
 hand and what is politically necessary and expedient on the other. Should peace-brokers be
 held accountable for negotiating arrangements that violate fundamental rights? To date,
 political scientists, who tend to be proponents of power-sharing and seem to ignore the rule
 and role of law in political transitions, have controlled the debate over the legitimacy of
 power-sharing, which unfortunately has slipped under the radar of international lawyers.
 This paper was inspired by the apparent disregard for the sanctity of the rule of law in the
 literature on power-sharing and among decision-makers, who seem to discount its relevance
 altogether?especially those responsible for negotiating the Accra and Lome accords, which
 arguably prescribed illegal power-sharing irrespective of long-term social costs. To what
 extent, if any, does and should the rule of law influence the character of peace negotiations,
 agreements, and political transitions? To what extent should the rule of law sanction political
 * Associate Professor, Director, Program for Human Rights & Global Justice, Florida International College of Law.
 1 These remarks represent an abbreviated and modified version of an earlier essay, Jeremy I. Levitt, Illegal
 Peace ? Examining the Legality of Power-sharing with Warlords and Rebels in Africa, 27 Mich. J. Int' l L. 495 (2006).
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 elites that broker illegal peace agreements? This paper represents a conscientious attempt to
 address these questions and present a conceptual framework for examining the legal and
 political efficacy of coercing democratically constituted governments into sharing power. It
 seeks to define a lawful basis or approach to sharing power when governments are confronted
 with the aforementioned scenario, and again ponders whether those who share power should
 be held civilly or criminally liable when power is shared illegally.
 This paper raises normative legal questions about the dominant logic that political power
 sharing is lawful, legitimate, and unequivocally serves the public good, arguing that power
 sharing deals that ignore controlling rules are unlawful and not viable. It centers on states
 emerging from civil conflict and focuses on the issue of power-sharing between democratically
 constituted governments, and warlords and rebels who have committed or participated in the
 commission of international crimes.
 Power-sharing, as opposed to amnesty, for example, is the subject here. This is a critically
 important contribution given that power-sharing is more expansive and has a greater impact
 on sustainable peace than amnesty, which is conceptually and practically more narrow and,
 typically, a lesser but necessary element of power-sharing. In other words, amnesty may be
 given without sharing power, but power-sharing without amnesty is atypical. Amnesty applies
 to certain individuals and/or groups whereas power-sharing directly affects a state's entire
 population, as it reconstructs or reorders the framework of governance and its future disposi
 tion. This is why a discussion of the criminalization of illegal power-sharing is critically
 important as power-sharing arrangements are typically long-term and systemic and determine
 who will have a seat at the table of power, in what capacity, and for how long. This type
 of peace raises vital questions about the governance and developmental challenges faced by
 war-torn states.
 The logic behind power-sharing assumes that rebels and warlords will behave and act as
 good citizens once they are given authoritative positions. It presupposes that warlords can
 become democrats once sanctioned with state authority. Power-sharing with warlords and
 rebels also sets a negative precedent, as it sends a dangerous message to would-be insurrection
 ists that violence is a legitimate means to effectuate change and obtain political power. For
 these reasons, the subject of power-sharing deserves distinct analysis, separate and apart
 from amnesty?particularly concerning its impact on the rule of law in post conflict societies.
 I argue that when democratically constituted regimes are forced to choose between negotiat
 ing peace and being violently dislodged from power, peace agreements based on the rule of
 law should prevail over extralegal arrangements bom out of political necessity and expediency.
 This is so because "legal peace" has fewer adverse impacts on the political order and is
 more sustainable than "illegal peace." Those deciding to share power should consider not
 simply political variables but also legal ones, as the law has an important regulatory role to
 play: it must constrain the political aspirations of decision-makers and ensure the lawfulness
 of peace deals. Political elites should be held civilly or criminally accountable for striking
 deals that grossly violate international law. The point is that the rules governing the legality
 of peace agreements must be adhered to, particularly when the beneficiaries of power-sharing
 acquired power undemocratically and unlawfully and are likely responsible for committing
 human atrocities. The logic underpinning this position raises several difficult questions for
 governments under siege: Who is responsible for internal disorder, repression, and post
 conflict justice? Is it immoral for a government to allow deadly conflict to continue until
 "legal peace" is reached?
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 These questions raise several questions about when, if ever, leaders should accept "illegal
 peace.'' Should individual responsibility for repression be excused for the perceived collective
 good? Should power-sharing and amnesty take precedence over retributive justice? Should
 the political prerogatives of warlords and rebels supersede the fundamental civil, political,
 and human rights of their victims? I believe in a victims-based approach that seeks to hold
 political elites, whether professional warlords or members of government, responsible for
 entering into power-sharing arrangements that continue a culture of impunity through amnesty
 and sharing power.
 Arguments for Power-Sharing
 It may be argued that power-sharing is an effective way to give all parties stake in
 governance, and that the underlining goal is to give warring factions political legitimacy and
 decision-making authority in government with the hope they will stop fighting and take a
 vested interest in the vitality of the state. It follows that sharing power neutralizes violent
 conflict and that opening the political process serves a public good and makes an essential
 contribution to any transition to lasting peace.
 It may further be argued that power-sharing is necessary in states embroiled in war and
 is often the only way to forestall conflict, restore the rule of law, strengthen societal support
 for government, and create the political space for democratic elections and transition. Without
 power-sharing, it is argued, rebels and warlords may have no incentive to negotiate peace
 and will return to the battlefield for fear of political, economic, and social disenfranchisement.
 Hence, governments share power to stop unwinnable wars. This type of reasoning supports
 the popular notion that peace without power-sharing may not be realistic or attainable.
 Arguments Against Power-Sharing
 The most fundamental argument against power-sharing appears in domestic, regional,
 subregional, and international law and policy: rebels, warlords, and other abusers who have
 sponsored or directed atrocities or sought to capture state power violently and undemocrati
 cally for economic rewards, political power, or any other reason have committed domestic
 and international crimes. It follows that peace agreements, irrespective of amnesty, should
 not empower these individuals to rule over their victims or wreak further havoc with the
 legitimacy of state authority. Peace brokers who proscribe such remedies, particularly those
 entrusted to protect the public good, should be held accountable for striking unlawful deals.
 This position holds peace-makers responsible for their actions by setting a standard for what
 is and is not legally permissible, and it rejects the ludicrous assumption, inherent in the
 practice, that warlords and rebels are intent on becoming practicing democrats, accepting
 instead the argument that power-sharing sends the signal to other would-be rebels that
 violence is a viable way to obtain political power. In this sense, power-sharing in postwar
 contexts connotes something far more difficult than sharing power with political opponents;
 it perhaps unrealistically necessitates a societal psychology of forgiveness and with it the
 ability of citizens to live and work peacefully with their enemies. Lastly, as is the case in
 Liberia and Sierra Leone, power-sharing may generate "feelings of distrust towards the new
 government and the political system, and encourage cynicism towards the rule of law."2
 The hurdle of legitimacy, particularly as it relates to which factions will acquire authority
 2 Diba Majzub, Peace or Justice? Amnesties and the International Criminal Court, 3 Melb. J. Int'l L. 251 (2002).
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 over which key government portfolios (foreign affairs, defense, intelligence, internal security,
 justice, and natural resources), could undermine a peaceful political transition.
 The Accra and Lome Accords
 The Accra and Lome Accords are composed of thirty-seven articles with similar structure
 and content including cease-fire, military, human rights, implementation, and power-sharing
 components. The accords did not offer any legal basis or authority to legitimize their power
 sharing provisions but, rather, prescribed extra-legal rules and processes for sharing power
 that abrogated constitutionally based superior rules. The only legitimizing authority for
 power-sharing seems to have rested solely in the accords themselves. The accords not only
 violated state authority, fundamental rights, and executive and legislative power principles
 enshrined in constitution law, but also well-settled regional and international human rights
 law and emerging democracy norms.3
 Conclusion
 In conclusion, I argue that sharing power with warlords and rebels who unseat democrati
 cally constituted regimes is unlawful and that peace-makers have a legal obligation to comport
 with the rule of law in making peace deals. The failure to abide by controlling rules should
 result in civil, and even criminal, sanctions against peace brokers and the elites that endorse
 their prescriptions. This analysis, along with empirical studies, show that power sharing with
 warlords and rebels more often than not creates short-term fixes and long-term political
 instability resulting in continued conflict. In order to make a long-term and "legal peace,"
 decision-makers should adhere to several principles when negotiating peace arrangements:
 take stock of all governing rules before beginning peace negotiations;
 allow governing rules to shape and influence the character of negotiations (i.e., what
 is legally permissible and what is not);
 work within, not outside, the existing legal framework, using governing rules as the
 minimum standard of acceptability;
 be unswerving in mediatory approaches by sending consistent messages to the rele
 vant parties;
 seek timely international support for rule-based approaches using affirmative induce
 ments such as recognition, aid, trade, and support in reforming the security sector;
 ensure that peacemakers remain in control of negotiations and implementation pro
 cesses and do not allow warlords to retain vetoes and rewards;
 realize that the protection of human rights and democracy is integral, and not contrary,
 to security and remember that international law prevails over domestic peace accords
 in any conflict of law.
 As Crocker and Hampson have noted, "[t]he lesson, then, is to not permit military policies
 to become unhinged or detached from the broader [legal and] political purposes they are
 intended to serve."4 Also, timidity in the face of armed militias is not effective?especially
 when the clock is working in their favor."5 It is the concern over security and a resumption
 of war that provides the best rationale not to share power with warlords and rebels who will
 3 See generally id.
 4 Chester Crocke & Fen Osier Hampson, Making Peace Settlements Work, Foreign Pol'y, Fall 1996, at 69.
 5Id.
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 undoubtedly inject criminal and predatory behavior into the political culture. International
 donors and multilateral organizations taking part in negotiation processes need to serve as
 legal?as opposed to moral?guarantors in order to ensure adherence to governing rules
 and protect fundamental legal rights. They should hold peace-makers civilly or criminally
 accountable for negotiating deals that violate fundamental human rights. States and multilat
 eral institutions that sanction peace deals have a positive duty to protect human rights and
 democracy and not subvert them.
This content downloaded from 
            168.223.101.152 on Fri, 05 Feb 2021 12:47:46 UTC             
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
